It's been known for a while, and certainly long before the recent AI vuln flood, that ghostscript is really problematic in terms of security.
Ultimately, postscript is its own programming language, and executing a programming language in a secure, sandboxed way is not trivial. ghostscript has only a very poor pseudo sandbox that fails regularly. Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
All of that would matter much less if people only used it to parse postscript. But it's used indirectly by imagemagick (you can disable it), which means many people using imagemagick to parse images from untrusted sources get exposed to ghostscript's poor security.
> Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
That needs lots of qualifiers. It's the only popular and widely distributed open-source implementation with known good performance and wide compatibility.
There were so many other implementations and vibed ports already that I expect ghostscript to be actually replaced in distros within a year or two. Very random example https://github.com/AndyCappDev/postforge
Yes, and people didn't previously write big webpages, come up with a fancy name, and notify about a dozen different companies before just writing a ghostscript fix.
No previously it was just confined to OpenSSL bugs (2014) [1], linux kernel race conditions (2016) [2], CPU speculative execution (2018) [3] just to randomly list some of the earlier ones.
It quickly became cringe, but the annoyance you're feeling right now is not due to folks branding vulns.. It's that the rate of these bugs has gone up 5-20x since ~July this year.
Unfortunately this is the new normal. It's not going to get "better" any time soon.
You install ImageMagick, it most likely depends on Ghostscript.
You use something else than ImageMagick, say, to resize an uploaded image, and the moment it sees a color-managed image, it will produce something that looks like puke.
I had to do a very custom build of ImageMagick to get rid of dependencies on libgs and libX11. It wasn't fun.
ImageMagick was problematic for so long by pulling everything and the kitchen sink as dependencies. It's just not something you'd like to replace because it's got nice features and... works. It feels absurd but right now, if you have a very narrow use case (like just resizing), it may be better to make an LLM create an alternative, in a safer language, with validated core components, tested on a large number of samples.
Seriously, it's just such a bad design. Extremely dense but at the same time extremely devoid of any info. Sorry for the broad negativity here, but this page just screams "I want CVE cred" without providing any useful info on whether this is a "patch now pants on fire" or "yeah maybe next cycle".
At least they didn't lead with a useless CVSS score like all the other vulnerabilities we see popping up now.
This is just what slop sites look like. The LLM doesn't "understand" that the reader doesn't have it's context window in front of them when reading their output (i.e., the webpage) because to it everything is in the same bucket. IMHO this is probably because the attention of the transformer model by design lights up details that are relevant to the model but irrelevant to the reader.
Same goes for basically any descriptive text they output (documentation, comments, commit messages, etc).
I also experience it in the other direction. When you build an app and it guesses a relation wrongly, then you tell it “this is wrong, it works like X, not like Y”. The LLM then cannot stop itself from writing that into every user-facing description where this relation comes up. As a user it then sounds, as if a car manual was written: to accelerate the car, press the throttle (not the steering wheel). I then have to spend prompts telling it to only describe the resulting spec, not the way we worked towards it, and that (quite high) concept then gets lost again the next time some description needs to be written
It makes me feel dumb when I'm trying to read this stuff. It actually took me a while to figure out what it was. I kind of thought I was going crazy. (esp since these characteristics would change from one version to another; particularly Opus 4.5 to 4.7, then to 5.0, and now 5.5 seems to be a step backwards.
You can tell it until you're blue in the face to be more explicit, but it's always re-active, and it just seems like you can't make it proactively be more explicit and clear.
Some days I have to really struggle to get through just one page of text from Claude trying to explain something to me. Especially when it's a complex problem with a lot of small components to it.
That timeline is unreadable. Just say what was found impacted when with versions along with patch dates and versions. I don't need to know about case studies that will hypothetically be written. I don't need little blurbs under everything. "What we said" should instead be "publicly disclosed."
Honestly the whole thing should be a table so you can group the different bits of the timeline for different software/services by software/service rather than time.
Someone on twitter looked up every 2shell domain registered in the last month, there's still like 30 more of these in the pipe (or someone just collecting)
ghostscript, imagemagick, ffmpeg, etc. etc. all these passthrough data in data out programs that don't need much of anything from the system, I'd think people would run them with untrusted input in a tight whitelist based seccomp+landlock sandbox. it's a bit annoying if they are not statically compiled, due to ld.so loading libraries, but possible.
Do you think people will finally start removing decade old cruft from libraries and/or start creating single purpose minimal libraries? Or will the defense be just reactionary and on per cve basis?
"Mishell" by The Byteless, about endianness (these are "words" that go together well)
"Ring my shell" by Anita Reward, about bounties for remote terminal exploits (I guess You did by the look in your eyes - Look in your eyes, look in your eyes)
"Screen is blue" a classic by Andre Popp Upp about the well known behavior of windows OS family.
I'm dubious of some of the claims in the timeline. I have no doubt they found an RCE vuln, but people know that your document rendering service should be sandboxed (beyond Ghostscript's sandbox). So it's a bit disingenuous not to acknowledge that their RCEs for companies like Google and Dropbox almost certainly only get them into tightly sandboxed servers that lacked any sensitive access, exactly for this reason.
Theoretically, you could make a PostScript program that would output an image of a robot arm strangling its human handler, while also directing said robot arm to strangle its human handler.
Ultimately, postscript is its own programming language, and executing a programming language in a secure, sandboxed way is not trivial. ghostscript has only a very poor pseudo sandbox that fails regularly. Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
All of that would matter much less if people only used it to parse postscript. But it's used indirectly by imagemagick (you can disable it), which means many people using imagemagick to parse images from untrusted sources get exposed to ghostscript's poor security.
That needs lots of qualifiers. It's the only popular and widely distributed open-source implementation with known good performance and wide compatibility.
There were so many other implementations and vibed ports already that I expect ghostscript to be actually replaced in distros within a year or two. Very random example https://github.com/AndyCappDev/postforge
But it could be worse. Cairo and Pillow are very established.
It quickly became cringe, but the annoyance you're feeling right now is not due to folks branding vulns.. It's that the rate of these bugs has gone up 5-20x since ~July this year.
Unfortunately this is the new normal. It's not going to get "better" any time soon.
[1]: https://www.heartbleed.com/ [2]: https://dirtycow.ninja/ [3]: https://spectreattack.com
This sounds like an afternoon’s worth of prompting could double the number of implementations.
You use something else than ImageMagick, say, to resize an uploaded image, and the moment it sees a color-managed image, it will produce something that looks like puke.
I had to do a very custom build of ImageMagick to get rid of dependencies on libgs and libX11. It wasn't fun.
ImageMagick has a big attack surface, when most people probably use it just for cropping and resizing.
Just use something leaner, when you can.
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-125396
At least they didn't lead with a useless CVSS score like all the other vulnerabilities we see popping up now.
Same goes for basically any descriptive text they output (documentation, comments, commit messages, etc).
You can tell it until you're blue in the face to be more explicit, but it's always re-active, and it just seems like you can't make it proactively be more explicit and clear.
Some days I have to really struggle to get through just one page of text from Claude trying to explain something to me. Especially when it's a complex problem with a lot of small components to it.
Honestly the whole thing should be a table so you can group the different bits of the timeline for different software/services by software/service rather than time.
But now, even things that are not 4j get the 4shell "pun". But... it doesn't work.
in fact, many do. if you're not doing this all your unsafe file processing in 2026, you're in for a bad time!
Who cares about the name all bugs get stupid names.
"Mishell" by The Byteless, about endianness (these are "words" that go together well)
"Ring my shell" by Anita Reward, about bounties for remote terminal exploits (I guess You did by the look in your eyes - Look in your eyes, look in your eyes)
"Screen is blue" a classic by Andre Popp Upp about the well known behavior of windows OS family.
And the disclosure process is problematic if it's all the same issue.
And this is how the AI rebellion started