I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
An OS that rejected non determinism could really find a niche. Anyone over the age of 35 hates it when their phone changes its behavior, or moves a checkbox from one submenu to another, let alone having a chatbot taking actions on your behalf.
If it goes as well as Firefox OS, maybe not the best idea.
But a pager-style device is certainly doable if there is a market for it, and probably the best in terms of security. The question is whether or not Signal (the company) accepts it on their network. Normally, they don't allow third party clients.
If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
This is one of those obvious situations where should and reality are not any where close to each other. Of course, Apple will want the default to be open and every thing whitelisted so "it just works". When someone wants their new shiny to be accepted, they will never go for the everything must be specifically allowed by user as the default.
The way they ought to do it is like this: The app specifies the default (which is "allowed" if they don't specify, but then Signal can specify otherwise), the user can then change it either way, and the app is given no means to tell if the user has changed it (so evil corp can't inhibit the user from doing what they want).
Yeah, unfortunately the guy who really championed privacy at Apple, passed away. Jobs would have been furious if AI had access to his chats without his permission.
As long as there's an easy way to get to it that doesn't involve digging through settings. The whole "[app] wants to paste from your clipboard" prompt is so god damn annoying.
Hate to be that guy, but why would that option be Siri, or even Signal, specific?
If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent any app, on any OS from getting screen access?
Serious question.
I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way.
BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end.
If i am not mistaken a user must approve screen access for any apps. By default they don’t have that. What signal asks for is to exclude their windows from the screenshots these other apps make.
I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app.
I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
Most modern malware is ram resident only, and it resists forensic analysis to hide the payload RCE.
The issue is telecoms are some of the most devious monopolists you will ever encounter. They literally helped change laws, add certification barriers, assist 3 letter organization campaigns on US citizens, and self-sign firmware images... blacklisting 3rd party OS on hardware though imei anti-theft systems.
Starlink is successful because they pulled off a miracle business deal getting these telecoms to cooperate with Direct Connect satellite VoLTE services. =3
What do you mean? GrapheneOS recommends using their sandboxed Play Store to download apps, and Signal recommends downloading their app from Play Store.
The GrapheneOS store has less than 20 apps and does not include third-party ones, just system apps.
You can't be serious about privacy with a closed-source app and centralized server.
Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.
It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.
It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.
I don't quite get this take... I can't know what's actually running on any production system out there (except my own), because giving anyone access would be a fatal choice.
What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
The actively fight against self hosted Signal servers and clients - like those where you can know what it is running because it is you (or your friends) running it!
As a person working on privacy tech, this attitude, as well as the one in some of the sibling comments is a major reason we don't have better privacy solutions. Signal is not just better then nothing. It's better then all of the viable alternatives.
You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
It is still valid to point out the false sense of security, not to mention there being an intentional single point of failure (and metadata monitoring).
In case anyone is unaware, Facebook (and WhatsApp) use the Signal protocol for encryption, although my understanding is they don't fully utilize all the security features that Signal does. I also trust the Signal foundation much more than Meta.
I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
(I’m a regular donator, in case this is a subtle dig to put my money where my mouth is, but yes - everyone who finds real value in it should support them.)
Spammers operate out of countries where they have no fear of legal consequences, so all Signal has to do to deter them from the crypto option is make it more expensive than bulk phone numbers are.
It still costs money. I don't see why money in a different form would cause more spam. If it did, they could raise the price if they're getting more spam.
I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.
Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.
The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
The 501c3 named Signal is effectively running a giant honeypot, or in simpler terms a "scam".
In real-world practice, the 501c3 named Signal and Amazon Web Services that its servers run on can see the metadata of which users messaged which other users at what time.
This is why they haven't given the users the option to invite other users with a string (or "token" or whatever) so the inviting user can be messaged without a PSTN number or Google id being demanded from the invitee.
If you're trying to buy some good shit on the street or meet up at "da show" with urbanite degenerates, Signal is great.
Serious people, infosec pros, execs, etc stopped using Signal about two years ago -- at least that's what I saw from my corner of the world.
So what do “serious” people use? I have a pretty easy life so I don’t bother straying away from the easy to use apps, but I’m still curious what the l33t hax0rs use.
Among the high net worth audience there are a handful of commercially supported forks of the Signal software in use. Others are using a supported fork of Element X which is deemed "polished" among by the less literate of users.
"Signal" in the previous comment referred to the service hosted by the 501c3 named Signal, not the body of open source software named Signal ; these are overlapping but different things.
FOSS quietly shines in the private (as in, among private entities).
Organizations that are universally recognizable as working on "serious" things have coalesced around Matrix and Element X or other Matrix clients (some not FOSS), instead of services hosted by third parties (such as Slack). Different audience but an example of modern literacy.
"Small" users such as "l33t hax0rs" which I read as "age range of teenager to college freshman", often set up their own XMPP servers and use OMEMO. Perhaps these users are not organized around something "serious", but their choice to have self-respect and gain literacy to act it out is something that can be taken seriously.
To answer your question more directly: anything with decent technical merit that either doesn't require a 3rd party or the 3rd party can be specifically chosen.
I recently wrote on this topic, not so much the technical pieces but the vibe-perspective
If you want real security and anonymity, with support for multiple and temporary identities, use SimpleX. Recommended by Whonix, which is recommended by Edward Snowden.
No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.
If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.
Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.
Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
My impression is that the desktop apps have never been very high on the list of priorities. They’ve always felt like checkbox tickers.
This is unfortunate because a lot of the people who are knowledgeable and care about security/privacy spend their days in front of a keyboard, which is always going to be vastly better to jot out messages with than any kind of handheld mobile device.
They give a literal settings option to block the content of the message in the push notification:
"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."
Open source both client and server, I can self host server, remove phone number requirement AND any other shenanigans you put as an alternative like payments to unmask people, then we have a start to talk about privacy, other than that, do not trust Signal.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
It’s interesting they even try to fight this fight because fundamentally they can never control one side of the conversation taking photos or otherwise logging. That they pretend its tractable at all makes me question their security in general.
Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.
They could go full mandatory remote attestion, in principle closing every hole but the analog one. This understanding of privacy, one in which the user is part of the threat model, slouches inevitably towards DRM.
Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
I built Groups, starting nearly a decade years ago, as a privacy-preserving CRM. Since then it’s been downloaded by about 6 million people in over 100 countries. It isn’t as big as Signal by any means, but it has an entirely different focus. You can download it and try it — it’s free:
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
I have family conversations in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.
This outlook is initially appealing. The problem with it is that it is not only your choice that matters, it is also the choice of your contacts. Do your contacts want you to share their private conversations with you with online AI, unencrypted? Do you want your private conversations to be leaked by your contacts?
These are all great things to worry about. But the fact is, there are lots of situations where if app X can't read data from app Y the data might as well not exist. Usability, security, and integrity are tradeoffs. If you make the app sufficiently unusable you can't protect anything because you just force people to copy the data by hand into a different app.
I'd imagine stuff like this is why, say, Telegram has a difference between "non-secret" and "secret" chats. I'd imagine all Signal would need is a similar mechanism for either locking down an existing chat or making a new locked-down chat. Then you could be confident that none of its participants could be passing it to a leaky or unscrupulous provider.
Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
How about they start encrypting at rest Signal desktop!
Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?
they write that every os screenshots all screen content, sends it to a server to be analyzed, and half the comments are bitching how signal is not actually secure.
Oh, so they will finally support others to build compatible federated alternative servers and clients, make all builds reproducible and drop the need for phone numbers once and for all, right ? Right ?
Some people aren't reading the whole article. You can turn it off if you disagree with the product decision. I'm sure there will be folks mad on the opt-in/out axis either way.
That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.
Yes, you’d really have to look at, like, their track record - for instance, an entity with something like 20 fucking years of delivering a messaging platform that the fucking FBI regularly complains they can’t read could make that statement with a little more credibility than whoever you’re thinking of.
As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
This is a reasonable take, though I would add that simply compromising the notification server is enough to get the metadata about who's talking to who.
My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.
It turns out that good privacy tech doesn't rely on jurisdictions.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
servers, computers and users all live inside a jurisdiction.
Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.
You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.
Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).
E2EE is only about message contents. Intelligence services have made it clear that metadata is enough for them, and Signal's code (since at least the introduction of Intel SGX features) doesn't protect that, precisely because of server jurisdiction.
"Moxie Marlinspike" I am not going to trust some jabroni, straight out of central casting, who doesn't even fly by his family name. Seems like yet another usgov+hollywood fabrication. Good on you.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
if it was, it wouldn't require a phone number or a payment to sign up. that's an utter non-starter for a privacy tool. no public API, no third-party clients, no first-party web client. Signal Messenger LLC is, painfully obviously, a SaaS company operating at a loss and waiting for a buyout from a megacorp.
and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.
I will stick with services that can be my dumb pipe and use E2EE libraries that can do MLS [1], OMEMO [2], OTR [3], GPG [4] and manage keys out of band but I do appreciate that services like signal exist to limit the number of governments that can eavesdrop.
And how many of the people you chat with daily use all those? Your friends, relatives, elementary school classmates, high school friends who still call you over for a beer (and you them), coworkers from previous projects with new leads etc.?
Friends and family use my chat server as a fallback when their primary platform is offline and/or when they have something more sensitive to share such as anything financial related. Some of them know a keyword that means to jump onto my server. I would never try to replace their primary platform.
If you don't like Electron, there are also unofficial apps that run natively. For example, I created a Qt based Signal client called Corvus. However, just because the official Client is built with Electron doesn't automatically mean it's insecure. The Signal developers probably know a lot more about these things, so my client is likely less secure in that regard. Not to mention the fact that you then have to trust another person beside the signal devs.
signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
Corrections/clarifications on top of what others have mentioned:
- WhatsApp only ever said they used an older version of the Signal protocol (that, e.g. lacks post-quantum encryption).
- I think WhatsApp can encrypt your backups, but that is not the default.
The backup thing, plus the AI stuff mentioned in the article make it much more likely your WhatsApp conversations end up stored in the clear somewhere than your Signal conversations.
The other main reason WhatsApp is currently worse than Signal is that WhatsApp harvests your metadata (to support Meta's ad-tech business) and Signal does not.
WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
Just give me tech that works the same every time.
But a pager-style device is certainly doable if there is a market for it, and probably the best in terms of security. The question is whether or not Signal (the company) accepts it on their network. Normally, they don't allow third party clients.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent any app, on any OS from getting screen access?
Serious question.
I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way.
BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end.
Rust / WebAssembly can do a lot.
The issue is telecoms are some of the most devious monopolists you will ever encounter. They literally helped change laws, add certification barriers, assist 3 letter organization campaigns on US citizens, and self-sign firmware images... blacklisting 3rd party OS on hardware though imei anti-theft systems.
Starlink is successful because they pulled off a miracle business deal getting these telecoms to cooperate with Direct Connect satellite VoLTE services. =3
https://signal.org/android/apk/
The GrapheneOS store has less than 20 apps and does not include third-party ones, just system apps.
Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.
It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.
It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.
[0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android
[1]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS
[2]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server
What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.
You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.
But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.
There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...
SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.
https://signal.org/donate/
I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.
Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.
The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
In real-world practice, the 501c3 named Signal and Amazon Web Services that its servers run on can see the metadata of which users messaged which other users at what time.
This is why they haven't given the users the option to invite other users with a string (or "token" or whatever) so the inviting user can be messaged without a PSTN number or Google id being demanded from the invitee.
If you're trying to buy some good shit on the street or meet up at "da show" with urbanite degenerates, Signal is great.
Serious people, infosec pros, execs, etc stopped using Signal about two years ago -- at least that's what I saw from my corner of the world.
it comes across like more of a ploy to get you to scare people away and get them to use other, less secure, messengers
"Signal" in the previous comment referred to the service hosted by the 501c3 named Signal, not the body of open source software named Signal ; these are overlapping but different things.
FOSS quietly shines in the private (as in, among private entities).
Organizations that are universally recognizable as working on "serious" things have coalesced around Matrix and Element X or other Matrix clients (some not FOSS), instead of services hosted by third parties (such as Slack). Different audience but an example of modern literacy.
"Small" users such as "l33t hax0rs" which I read as "age range of teenager to college freshman", often set up their own XMPP servers and use OMEMO. Perhaps these users are not organized around something "serious", but their choice to have self-respect and gain literacy to act it out is something that can be taken seriously.
To answer your question more directly: anything with decent technical merit that either doesn't require a 3rd party or the 3rd party can be specifically chosen.
I recently wrote on this topic, not so much the technical pieces but the vibe-perspective
Signal is for pretend-security.
No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.
If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.
Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
Can we please stop it with this?
Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.
Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
This is unfortunate because a lot of the people who are knowledgeable and care about security/privacy spend their days in front of a keyboard, which is always going to be vastly better to jot out messages with than any kind of handheld mobile device.
If you need to reduce spam sign-ups, let me pay a few dollars in crypto instead.
Now a Signal account will be linked directly to your Google/Apple account and credit card.
I for one 100% agree with you, they should accept crypto, regardless.
"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.
Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
https://groups.app/confidential.html
https://qbix.com/GROUPS
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...
I have family conversations in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.
Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?
what a sad day for hackernews
That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.
The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.
Similar claims from big tech ad-companies I support... taking with a grain of salt.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
[0]: https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.
You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.
Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).
I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.
As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.
I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.
Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/
if it was, it wouldn't require a phone number or a payment to sign up. that's an utter non-starter for a privacy tool. no public API, no third-party clients, no first-party web client. Signal Messenger LLC is, painfully obviously, a SaaS company operating at a loss and waiting for a buyout from a megacorp.
and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security
[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO
[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...
[4] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard
It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.
How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?
Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?
This is a very unfocused team.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
Is it nowadays? AI should be able to port the app to any OS in a couple days.
Companies even want you to think that them securely holding all your data is the same as it being private to you. That's on purpose.
- WhatsApp only ever said they used an older version of the Signal protocol (that, e.g. lacks post-quantum encryption).
- I think WhatsApp can encrypt your backups, but that is not the default.
The backup thing, plus the AI stuff mentioned in the article make it much more likely your WhatsApp conversations end up stored in the clear somewhere than your Signal conversations.
The other main reason WhatsApp is currently worse than Signal is that WhatsApp harvests your metadata (to support Meta's ad-tech business) and Signal does not.