Java4Shell: RCE in OpenJDK when processing Base64

(calif.io)

247 points | by werrett 1 hour ago

33 comments

  • ievans 1 hour ago
    Super impressive work by Calif as usual.

    The exploit conditions are very specific but there are still going to be a lot of hosts impacted. We at Semgrep published some free detection scripts here: https://github.com/semgrep/detection-scripts/tree/main/CVE-2...

    They look for these five conditions:

      * HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].
      * x86-64 JVM on an x86-64 host.
      * Version 17.0.6 or later, not at or above a version listed in FIXED_IN, and no newer than the newest releases checked (see below). Newer versions are [?]: they may carry the fix.
      * The JVM reports avx512_vbmi and avx512bw, and UseAVX >= 3.
      * Base64 intrinsics are on and C2/JVMCI can compile. These turn it off: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock, -Xint, -XX:TieredStopAtLevel below 4.
    • bikezen 15 minutes ago
      The write-up itself matches your version assumption, however it also says:

      > According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.

      So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.

    • cjbprime 19 minutes ago
      Wouldn't it be prudent for someone to patch even if they aren't running their code on an AVX512 system right this moment? They could be running on one.. next moment.
      • Banditoz 10 minutes ago
        Sure, but I think it brings it down from "patch immediately" severity, to just "bump the JDK with next service deploy" severity.

        Or, do running machines often have their CPU changed from under them without much notice?

        • stackskipton 0 minutes ago
          Depends on the company and deployment method. As Ops person, I generally don't think much about rolling out different Kubernetes Nodes and what SKU I select. So yes, you could be running on one node type today and tomorrow I upgrade the nodes under you.
    • bonsai_spool 19 minutes ago
      This looks like Claudese - may be kind to write such things yourself if you intend for humans to read them. (For example, “ HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].” — I tried parsing at least five times before realizing you’re asking me to decipher LLM talk)
      • Yokolos 7 minutes ago
        I still don't understand what's meant with Azul. Is it affected or not? What is it never?
  • leca 1 hour ago
    What’s that old Chinese proverb? “May you live in interesting times”? It feels like we’re living in interesting times. How long will it take for a bad actor to seriously compromise critical infrastructure? My bet is within six months.

    The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.

    • ctoth 48 minutes ago
      > My bet is within six months

      My bet is it already happened two months ago and there's a whole secret scrum we only vaguely know about happening right now.

      • adrianpike 34 minutes ago
        Instability is often correlated to urgently performed change, and we've seen a lot of instability around the world lately.
        • pixl97 23 minutes ago
          A lot of organizations we sitting on internal bugs for years because they thought they were impossible to exploit, and now their red team can break them in hours.

          Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.

        • ChuckSneed 22 minutes ago
          Instability can also be attributed to AI slop code. That's the simplest explanation.
      • Analemma_ 20 minutes ago
        I think this bet is optimistically assuming a far more competent world than the one we actually have. Have you seen the idiot clowns actually in power? The agency that might've been tasked with this hypothetical secret scrum, CISA, has been gutted and left to rot because they thought it was an enemy plot to censor them on social media or whatever. There's no secret room where the smart people are fixing things.
  • drum55 47 minutes ago
    They aren’t wrong that we should be deleting more support and removing more features. The idea that the linux kernel by default builds support for all sorts of ancient systems nobody has ever heard of is absurd.
  • AgentME 1 hour ago
    Unconfirmed, but people on Twitter suggest this vulnerability has to do with the AVX512 implementation of Base64 decoding, and so this vulnerability can be worked around by running Java with the -XX:UseAVX=2 flag. (https://x.com/sean_a_cassidy/status/2122791344573976817)
    • _msw_ 52 minutes ago
      This isn't the best flag to mitigate, since it will fail on systems that don't support AVX2.

      I recommend -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics instead.

      • layer8 33 minutes ago
        Note that -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics requires -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions to work.
      • marginalia_nu 33 minutes ago
        What system supports AVX512 but not AVX2?
        • philipkglass 31 minutes ago
          I assume that the advice is referring to situations where you might have a mixture of ARM and AMD64 hosts, like on AWS, so you need to be careful about global flag updates that might not work across all instances.
          • marginalia_nu 23 minutes ago
            Surely you'd still need to know what you're deploying on. Can't plop an x86_64 JVM on an ARM host or vice versa, at least if you want them to run.
            • articulatepang 8 minutes ago
              I think the idea is that you’re already running the appropriate JVM on each architecture, but want to push a global command line flag update to every JVM you run, regardless of architecture, that prevents this exploit.

              Until, presumably, there’s fixes and you can test, update etc.

              • marginalia_nu 8 minutes ago
                Why'd you patch the commandline of JVMs that aren't vulnerable though?
            • philipkglass 12 minutes ago
              It's possible if you have enough abstraction layers. At my company there are a few systems with Java runtime flags specified in the service source code, but deployment configuration in a separate infrastructure-as-code repository. Switching between CPU architectures is normally transparent if you don't rely on native code libraries.
    • mey 1 hour ago
      If a system doesn't support AVX512, is it an issue?
      • cpach 58 minutes ago
        AFAICT: No.

        Edit: If I understood the article correctly, the machine needs to have all the four of these flags in order to be exploitable: avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi, bmi2

    • elric 1 hour ago
      There are presumably more bugs lurking in the hand crafted assembly intrinsics in the JVM. The many eyeballs and shallow bugs thing is only true when the eyeballs actually understand the code.
  • mzs 1 hour ago
    You can also mitigate Java4Shell by starting OpenJDK with either:

    -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to disable hardware-accelerated Base64 encoding and decoding, or

    -XX:UseAVX=2 to disable AVX-512. Apply this flag only on x86-64 hosts. OpenJDK on ARM doesn't recognize it and will fail to start.

    • layer8 35 minutes ago
      Note that -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics requires -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions to work.
    • marginalia_nu 1 hour ago
      Might be worth examining whether AVX-512 is even supported on the machine before freaking out, too.
  • benjiweber 1 hour ago
  • nacnud 1 hour ago
    More info here: https://www.upwind.io/blog/java4shell-what-we-know-now-and-w...

    It's a heap out-of-bounds write in Java’s AVX-512 Base64 decoder.

  • hypfer 1 hour ago
    Given that this is AVX512-only...how many enterprises are out there that run vulnerable java applications on non-intel servers?

    Genuine question. Everything I see is Intel all the time. I know that people at home switched to AMD, but they don't run enterprise java.

    I also have been told that apparently EPYC was hyped for a while and some hosters give you that. But do corporations run the java applications there?

    The name makes it sound like Log4J or the PHP thing, but from what I can tell right now, it kinda isn't all that relevant?

    • tptacek 21 minutes ago
      The Log4j comparison is always a little frustrating, because it sets the bar somewhere in the neighborhood of "apocalyptic". If you're someone who believes our response to serious vulnerabilities is inadequate, you can see how Log4Shell gives a lot of cover to companies.

      It is wild to find a generalizable (if platform-specific) memory corruption vulnerability in Java core Base64 handling; the tornado sirens should clearly be going off. But yes, it's not as bad as Log4Shell.

    • p_l 58 minutes ago
      Lots of AMD servers out there, both on-prem and in the cloud, though AVX-512 capable ones are relatively recent.
    • CodesInChaos 27 minutes ago
      We run many of our apps on AWS's graviton (ARM) to reduce costs.
      • t0mas88 1 minute ago
        Same here, and ARM64 is not affected by this CVE.
  • yabones 1 hour ago
    Before you keep your security team up all night, it looks like proxies save the day here. Might not be a complete fix, obviously a real patch should be applied as soon as possible.

    > Request streaming. Some current grooming profiles need partial request bodies to reach the application. A proxy that waits for the complete body removes their release timing. nginx buffers request bodies by default.

    https://calif.io/java4shell/#limitations

  • Noe2097 35 minutes ago
    This attack surface (manually optimized assembly code in the middle of software stacks) looks AWESOME
  • spidermonkey23 12 minutes ago
    The string of A's reminds me of the ssh exploit recently.
  • rbanffy 51 minutes ago
    Not everywhere... Requires an x86-64 processir with AVX512.
    • formerly_proven 43 minutes ago
      Pretty much any Intel server and most AMD servers are going to support AVX512 and conversely most VMs running in the cloud will have access to it.
      • rbanffy 30 minutes ago
        Speak for yourself. All my cloud VMs are ARM, with one exception, one s390x running Linux.
  • kaliszad 1 hour ago
    Seems like -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics is the better workaround for now.
    • layer8 33 minutes ago
      Note that -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics requires -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions to work.
  • fidotron 40 minutes ago
    This will almost certainly in practice affect a majority of Java app servers in production.

    What makes it nasty is triggering it could be done so easily by url decoding, sending an email or many other things.

  • cedricbonhomme 52 minutes ago
    Tracking sightings related to this vulnerability here: https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/CVE-2026-114938#sighting...
  • plmpsu 2 hours ago
    Does anyone know what the attack vector of this is? I'm trying to figure out if our usage is affected by this CVE.
    • fweimer 29 minutes ago
      GLM 5.3 produced this after a bit of prodding. I started out with the C++ sources with a bug marker instead of the fix: https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/commit/5177a70b385c16f26ede19...

      There are only a bunch of commits that came in the latest merge of security fixes, and this one changed VBMI-related intrinsics code, so it's a good match for what was publicly disclosed at the time.

          import java.util.Arrays;
          import java.util.Base64;
          
          public class Canary {
              // static fields defeat escape analysis so dst/canary really live in the heap
              static byte[] dst;
              static byte[] canary;
          
              public static void main(String[] args) {
                  // (input, expected decodedOutLength) pairs:
                  //   65 = "A"*64 + "="    -> fragment "="   (length 1, trailing pad)
                  //   66 = "A"*64 + "Q="   -> fragment "Q="  (length 2, trailing pad)
                  //   67 = "A"*64 + "QQ="  -> fragment "QQ=" (length 3, trailing pad)
                  //   68 = "A"*64 + "QQ==" -> fragment 4 bytes, well-formed control case
                  int[][] cases = { { 65, 50 }, { 66, 50 }, { 67, 50 }, { 68, 49 } };
                  byte[][] srcs = new byte[cases.length][];
                  for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
                      int len = cases[c][0];
                      byte[] src = new byte[len];
                      Arrays.fill(src, (byte) 'A');
                      if (len == 65) { src[64] = '='; }
                      if (len == 66) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = '='; }
                      if (len == 67) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '='; }
                      if (len == 68) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '=';
                          src[67] = '='; }
                      srcs[c] = src;
                  }
          
                  int iters = 300_000;
                  for (int iter = 0; iter < iters; iter++) {
                      for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
                          byte[] src = srcs[c];
                          int dstLen = cases[c][1];
                          // fresh dst, then canary IMMEDIATELY after it in the TLAB
                          dst = new byte[dstLen];
                          canary = new byte[64];
                          Arrays.fill(canary, (byte) 0x41);
                          int before = canary.length;
                          try {
                              Base64.getDecoder().decode(src, dst);
                          } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
                              // expected for the malformed tails
                          }
                          if (canary.length != before || changed(canary)) {
                              System.out.println(
                                  "*** ITERATION " + iter + ", input length " + src.length
                                  + ": DESTINATION BUFFER OVERRUN DETECTED");
                              System.out.println(
                                  "canary.length = " + canary.length + " (expected 64)");
                              System.out.println(
                                  "canary bytes  = " + toHex(canary, 48));
                              return;
                          }
                      }
                      if (iter % 50_000 == 0)
                          System.out.println("iter " + iter + ": clean so far");
                  }
                  System.out.println(
                      "no corruption detected in " + iters + " iterations");
              }
          
              static boolean changed(byte[] b) {
                  for (byte x : b) if (x != 0x41) return true;
                  return false;
              }
          
              static String toHex(byte[] b, int n) {
                  StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
                  for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++)
                      sb.append(String.format("%02x ", b[i]));
                  return sb.toString();
              }
          }
      
      I had to fix toHex() not to use b.length, otherwise it wouldn't print anything due to the negative array length field.

          *** ITERATION 4076, input length 67: DESTINATION BUFFER OVERRUN DETECTED
          canary.length = -1700370022 (expected 64)
          canary bytes  = 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 69 a6 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 9a 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
      
      
      GLM had web access for this, and it was able retrieve the OpenJDK fix. I don't know if it found the reproducer in its web searches.

      Turning this into a reliable exploit probably still requires some expertise. It's going to depend on heap layout at the time of the overflow. Targets won't be auto-selecting themselves like they did for Log4Shell.

    • yabones 1 hour ago
      Some unverified sources have said it's in the Base64 decoder, but strangely only effecting AMD64 machines, so anything on ARM/graviton allegedly isn't impacted. Some sort of bug in some hyper-optimized code I reckon. That might mean any place that parses cookies, headers, urls, JWTs, SAML payloads, certificates, etc, might be exposed. Yikes.

      But the facts aren't really out yet, we'll learn more in coming hours and days...

    • vips7L 1 hour ago
      No details yet. Calif was supposed to release them at 1PT after the update was pushed out. The corretto release notes say its in hotspot/compiler.

      https://github.com/corretto/corretto-25/blob/25.0.5.1.2/CHAN...

    • explain 1 hour ago
      Here's the supposed patch (?): https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HXWyDZQXEAAPOVf?format=webp&name...

      `grep -ow avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u`

      `-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics -XX:UseAVX=2`

    • mwambua 2 hours ago
      [dead]
  • 9029 15 minutes ago
    So who leaked it?
  • mushufasa 48 minutes ago
    where is the dancing girl in the exploit videos???
    • 3dedb728-3f77 26 minutes ago
      Yes, this is pretty much required now after the last.
  • DarkmSparks 23 minutes ago
    me using java for so long I have my own util.Base64 class used everywhere in pure java.

    now panicking in case some LLM imported this without me noticing.

    edit: it did. :(

  • jeffbee 19 minutes ago
    If I owned an entire language platform with a JIT, it would not contain assembly in its standard library, it would simply be improved until it generated something at least that fast from high-level source code on that target CPU.

    This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.

  • cpach 1 hour ago
    .
    • ryanschaefer 56 minutes ago
      This should be the main thread as this is the primary source
  • nikanj 1 hour ago
    Just as with CVE-2026-98432, Debian is immediately patched at embargo drop, Ubuntu still isn't patched.

    Why do we even pay for Ubuntu?

    • cpach 52 minutes ago
      Are you sure? I can’t see any Debian advisory for this vuln.

      https://www.debian.org/security/

    • mitchweaver 20 minutes ago
      Uhh, Debian is NOT patched as of this writing.

      Fortunately I run name-brand Oracle(R) Java(tm), which did publish updated packages.

  • iririririr 56 minutes ago
    is this why half the banks worldwide are offline on and off since yesterday?
  • secondcoming 58 minutes ago
    Why would anyone write the scalar part of a SIMD'd function in assembly code!?
    • magackame 41 minutes ago
      pure love for the game
  • dboreham 1 hour ago
    "vibe-uncoding" -- have actually been doing quite a bit of that in my older projects.
  • doctorpangloss 1 hour ago
    is this the root cause of the issue befalling making giant companies right now? i think it's a java DOS for sure, but an RCE?
    • TZubiri 1 hour ago
      Looks unrelated, this is being disclosed now but it was discovered a couple of weeks ago and is just now being made public at the same time.

      Also I haven't looked into it, but I'm willing to be it's some free after-use memory corruption thing that has a CVSS Attack Complexity of high, the 'RCE' is speculative, and private companies push social media headlines to fit the AI cybersecurity narrative.

      Not saying the doom isn't right, but sometimes it's more like a Wednesday than doomsday. Just patch it and move on. Thanks to all involved though in disclosing and patching though.

  • Agataproximadev 3 minutes ago
    [flagged]
  • nassirkhan 10 minutes ago
    [flagged]
  • Sigmazero60 1 hour ago
    We set UseAVX=2 on all our jdk hosts last year for unrelated thermal issues, turns out that saved us here
  • spullara 28 minutes ago
    please stop using native code that hasn't been proven
  • eyalitki 1 hour ago
    The fact that mainstream modules have such trivial bugs in logic that can be fully covered by testing is staggering. It is about time software developers will have proper test coverage for their code, at least for basic "unit" modules. Maybe we can even name a testing philosophy to match it.
    • Noe2097 52 minutes ago
      Not sure this is as trivial as it seems. The bug triggers on a specific instruction set, on a precise input length, with a specific character at the end, and when on the hot path, and requires low level memory access checking to be detected.
      • spockz 12 minutes ago
        For the finished jre yes. But one would hope these kind of checks are also run on a hand rolled decoder function. Fuzzing that one and finding logic bugs is a lot easier
    • ajasmin 57 minutes ago
      Finding these kind of bugs would have required fuzzing and some kind of bound checking canaries. Not sure all bound checkers work on the hand-optimized assembly.

      Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...

    • layer8 26 minutes ago
      [dead]